614 182 not unlikely to meet her request. Her brother's children will fear her constant demands and her threats of sorcery. Her actual power is so great that a religious construct, proclaiming her social distance from the men of the clan, and making her look low and insignificant, may help somewhat to keep the embattled clan patrimony together. It is therefore [842] tempting to treat Orokaiva parthenogenesis theory as offering further evidence for the tension between patrilateral and matrilateral kin, though this tension could be demonstrated more easily by less esoteric means.

114 171 842 The Orokaiva case makes one wonder just what constitutes 'knowledge of physiological paternity'. Leach writes about 'basic facts of physiological paternity' (1967: 41) which anyone but an idiot would know. On the other hand, Spiro speaks of a 'theory' and compares 'physiological paternity' to the 'heliocentric universe' (1968: 244)—the latter was a theory that man did not have until the fifteenth century. Spiro does not quite indicate at what point in time mankind obtained 'knowledge' of the former theory, but he evidently thinks it was well before the birth of Jesus. I am not sure just how Spiro would classify the case of the Orokaiva: are they 'ignorant' of physiological paternity or not? Are they less ignorant than the Trobrianders but more ignorant than the Dobuans (who do not believe in virgin birth at all)? Do not all these groups derive their theory on this subject in precisely the same way, namely in the context of a metaphysical cognitive system? It seems to me that a significant difference between the Melanesians and modern man, if it exists at all, does not lie in the substantive content of their theory of physiological paternity, but in the capacity of modern man to show by empirical evidence that the Trobrianders are wrong, the Dobuans right and the Orokaiva in between. As for the contemporaries of Jesus, they seem to resemble the Melanesians rather than modern man, in that they had no such empirical evidence.

121 I think that in primitive thought we should distinguish between empirical generalisations, which may often imply no more than a rough statistical correlation, and deductive theories implying causal connexions. It is notorious [813] that primitive thought will easily move from [814] the former to the latter, as the Orokaiva do, for instance, when they note that *taupa* leaves fall while the main taro crop is coming up and postulate that it is the dropping *taupa* leaves that cause the crop to prosper. There is no reason to believe, however, that the Orokaiva *invariably* make a causal theory out of an empirical correlation and they may even omit to do so where modern thought would applaud such a step. A person may 'know' as